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MIRANDA, DICKERSON, AND THE 
PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF FIFTH 
AMENDMENT EXCEPTIONALISM 
Stephen J. Schulhofer* 
Dickerson v. United States1 preserves the status quo regime for ju­
dicial oversight of police interrogation. That result could be seen, iri 
the present climate, as a victory for due process values, but there re­
main many reasons for concern that existing safeguards are flawed -
that they are either too restrictive or not restrictive enough. Such con­
cerns are partly empirical, of course. They depend on factual assess­
ments of how much the Miranda rules do restrict the police. But such 
concerns also reflect a crucial, though often unstated, normative 
premise; they presuppose a certain view of how much the police 
should be restricted. 
To evaluate the Miranda safeguards and determine whether they 
should be replaced by some other regime, it is essential to focus first 
on that normative premise. And for present purposes I will restrict 
myself to its constitutional dimension. I will focus on a surprisingly ne­
glected question - that of determining which restrictions on police 
interrogation are mandated by ordinary Fifth Amendment principles. 
My thesis is that the Court, even as it reaffirmed Miranda, perpetuated 
an extraordinarily confusing and illogical notion of what the Fifth 
Amendment means. Both the Court's majority in Dickerson and its 
dissenters share a conception of the Fifth Amendment that can be 
right only if the constitutional principles governing police interroga­
tion differ from those that determine Fifth Amendment compulsion in 
every other setting. In other words, the Court (and all its Justices) ap­
parently accept a kind of Fifth Amendment exceptionalism, under 
which the standards applicable to police interrogation are kept distinct 
from the standards applicable to all other official questioning of wit­
nesses and suspected offenders. 
* Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology, University of Chicago Law School. 
- Ed. I want to express special appreciation to Yale Kamisar. Even before we met, he had 
opened my eyes to the realities of police interrogation, and for many years he has been for 
me a generous and inspiring teacher. For comments on the manuscript, I owe thanks as well 
to participants at the conference and at the Fordham Law School Faculty Workshop, and to 
Abner Greene, Larry Kramer, and Carol Steiker. 
1. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000). 
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Part I of this Article defends that thesis. Part II then explores con­
ceivable alternatives to Miranda, and Part III suggests several ways to 
supplement the Miranda regime in order to bring it more closely into 
conformity with the Fifth Amendment principles that are accepted, 
largely without controversy, in every interrogation setting outside the 
police station. But first one preliminary: Are there any alternatives 
that the Court would tolerate as replacements for Miranda? 
Opponents of Miranda often complain that the Court eliminated 
promising alternatives, "blocked" experimentation, and locked us into 
a straitjacket of rigid rules.2 That was never a plausible reading of 
Miranda, and the Dickerson opinion re-emphasizes that the Court is 
perfectly willing to uphold alternatives to the Miranda system (that is, 
the system of police-delivered warnings, an express waiver prior to 
questioning, and respect for a suspect's request to cut off questioning 
at any time). The only limitation stated in Dickerson is one that ap­
pears almost verbatim in Miranda itself: any alternative must include 
"procedures that will warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain 
silent and which will assure the suspect that the exercise of that right 
will be honored. "3 
That is a reasonable and fairly minimal limitation. It's easy to 
imagine procedures that would meet it. Police could, for example, be 
excused from the warnings part of Miranda whenever warnings were 
given by a magistrate or by duty counsel at the stationhouse. There are 
many other ways to protect Fifth Amendment rights as effectively or 
more effectively than Miranda does, and if an alternative does that, 
there is no reason to worry that the Supreme Court would overturn it. 
That brings us to choosing among alternatives, which means figur­
ing out what problems a substitute for Miranda should seek to solve. 
I am going to set aside Professor Cassell's complaint that Miranda 
puts tens of thousands of violent criminals on the streets every year by 
lowering clearance and conviction rates. He and I have debated that 
claim many times, and it's hard to imagine that there could be any­
thing more to say about it.4 
2. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. 
U. L. REV. 387, 498 (1996). 
3. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335. The limitation, as originally stated in Miranda, is virtu­
ally identical: Any alternative must be "at least as effective in apprising accused persons of 
their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it." Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
4. See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 2; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: 
Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500 (1996) 
[hereinafter Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect]; Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: 
The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1084 (1996) [hereinafter 
Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs]; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 278 (1996); Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Negligible Effect on Law Enforcement: 
Some Skeptical Observations, 20 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 327 (1997); Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
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I think it's fair to say that Professor Cassell's position has not won 
overwhelming agreement from criminal justice scholars. And in 
Dickerson, after reams of paper had been devoted to raising the issue, 
no member of the Supreme Court nibbled at it. There's no hint, even 
from Chief Justice Rehnquist, that any Justice sees lost confessions as 
a serious problem,5 and there's no hint that the Court will give that 
concern any weight in future decisions. 
That in itself does not prove that Professor Cassell is wrong -
what does, in my opinion, is the data. In any case, for practical pur­
poses the lost-convictions issue is now moot. Professor Cassell is free 
to continue flogging that very dead horse if he wants to, but there's no 
reason why anyone else should devote energy to trying to solve what 
looks like a nonexistent problem. Miranda probably prevents some 
confessions, but it also helps the police obtain others. The great weight 
of the evidence suggests that the Miranda system, as currently admin­
istered, causes no net reduction in confession rates, clearance rates, or 
conviction rates.6 
The problems with Miranda lie almost entirely in the other direc­
tion - the Miranda system is too weak. That claim will sound odd to 
anyone used to hearing that Miranda mandates overinclusive prophy­
lactic rules and that it "sweeps more broadly than the Fifth 
Amendment itself."7 So it is essential that I begin with first principles 
and consider why and to what extent the Constitution restrains police 
interrogation in the first place. Then I will specifically address where 
Miranda falls short and propose several remedies. 
I. POLICE INTERROGATION AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
Much as I welcomed the Dickerson result and nearly all of the 
opinion's language, I was disappointed that the Court perpetuated 
confusion about the constitutional basis for restrictions on police in­
terrogation. The Fifth Amendment, as everyone knows, says that no 
person shall be "compelled" to be a witness against himself in a crimi­
nal case. Two misperceptions about "compulsion" are commonly 
Bashing Miranda is Unjustified - and Harmful, 20 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 347 (1997) 
(hereinafter Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda]. 
5. The Chief Justice does write, in his opinion for the court, that a "disadvantage of the 
Miranda rule" is that "a guilty person [may] go free as a result." 120 S. Ct. at 2336. But he 
mentions nothing to suggest that he considers this a frequent or serious problem, and imme­
diately after noting this disadvantage, he enumerates offsetting ways in which Miranda 
sometimes eases the task of insuring that a confession will be ruled admissible. 
6. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4; see also John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda 
Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (1998). 
7. The claim that Miranda "sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself" ap­
pears repeatedly in Rehnquist Court comments on the conceptual basis of Miranda. E.g., 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 306 (1985). 
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voiced. They are echoed in such Supreme Court opinions as Elstad, 
Tucker and Quarles,8 and to a lesser extent carried forward in 
Dickerson itself: (1) that a statement isn't really compelled unless it is 
judged "involuntary" within the meaning of Fourteenth Amendment 
due process, and (2) that judgments about real compulsion must con­
sider the totality of the circumstances in the particular case. 
Conservative unease about Miranda and the perception of its du­
bious legitimacy; not to mention temper tantrums like the one on dis­
play in Justice Scalia's Dickerson dissent, rest directly on these two 
premises - that compulsion means involuntariness and that judg­
ments about compulsion must consider the totality of the circum­
stances. Yet both of these premises are dead wrong. 
It may seem presumptuous for me to pronounce a legal assertion 
dead wrong when it appears over and over in opinions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court. But, nonetheless, as the next section explains, those 
two premises are indisputably wrong. Or - to put the point more po­
litely - those two premises can be right only if the constitutional prin­
ciples governing police interrogation differ from those that determine 
Fifth Amendment compulsion in every other setting. In other words, 
those two premises imply a kind of Fifth Amendment exceptionalism, 
under which the standards applicable to police interrogation, even un­
der Miranda, remain distinct from the standards applicable to all other 
official questioning of witnesses and suspected offenders. 
A. The Concept of Fifth Amendment Compulsion 
Consider the first premise - that compulsion means the kind of 
involuntariness barred by Fourteenth Amendment due process. This 
premise simply cannot be true. Compulsion cannot mean involuntari­
ness. Outside the context of police interrogation at least, it is impossi­
ble to equate compulsion with involuntariness because courts that 
consider themselves barred from ever admitting an involuntary state­
ment nonetheless routinely admit and use statements that are unambi­
guously compelled. 
A statement that is truly involuntary, one that has been coerced by 
"breaking the suspect's will," is never admissible for any purpose.9 But 
witnesses are routinely required to give statements under subpoena. 
Even when a person is a criminal suspect, he can, after a grant of im­
munity, be forced to give statements under subpoena.10 Such state­
ments are clearly and literally compelled. Yet, far from being inadmis­
sible, as involuntary statements are, these compelled statements are 
8. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974). 
9. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (1978). 
10. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
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unquestionably admissible; they are the bread and butter of virtually 
all judicial proceedings. Consider the Supreme Court's comment, the 
essential underpinning for its decision in United States v. Nixon, 11 that 
"it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be 
available . . . .  "12 Indeed, the Sixth Amendment grants the accused a 
constitutional right to compulsory process to call· witnesses in his fa­
vor; the Constitution mandates the admissibility of these compelled 
(but not involuntary) statements.U 
Waiver doctrine underscores the same point. When it comes to 
Fourteenth Amendment safeguards against involuntariness, against 
being subjected to coercion that breaks the will, talk of "waiver" is in­
apt. One can never waive the right not to have one's will overborne by 
intolerable pressure, by conduct that "shocks the conscience."14 But 
Fifth Amendment rights can be waived; once a witness testifies under 
oath, the court can compel her to answer questions under cross­
examination. Not by lashes or electric shock of course - that would 
overbear her will in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. But after 
a valid waiver, she can be subpoenaed, held in contempt, and sent to 
jail until she talks, even when her answers may incriminate her. Such 
measures obviously involve compulsion and are impermissible against 
a suspect who properly claims the Fifth Amendment, but they do not 
"overbear the will" in the way that the Fourteenth Amendment cate­
gorically forbids. 
If the suggested distinction between compelled and involuntary 
statements seems fine-spun and verbally artificial, we should try to 
imagine whether the law could manage without such a distinction. 
Clearly, we need some concept (call it concept A) to define the kind of 
pressures and penalties that government should never be allowed to 
deploy against a potential witness under any circumstances. With re­
spect to pressures and penalties that do not fall within A, we could 
conceivably say that government may use those methods to get testi­
mony from any potential witness, regardless of whether the witness is 
a criminal suspect or a person making a plausible claim of self­
incrimination. Under that view, any penalty that could be deployed 
against an ordinary witness (a contempt citation, for example) could 
also be used against a criminal defendant. That view would require re­
peal of the Fifth Amendment. 
As long as we have a Fifth Amendment, some of the pressures and 
penalties that can be freely deployed against ordinary witnesses will 
not be available as devices to obtain self-incriminating testimony from 
11. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
12. Id. at 709 (emphasis added). 
13. Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1967). 
14. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
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a criminal suspect. And we will therefore of necessity require some 
concept (call it concept Z) to identify those devices - that is, the pres­
sures and penalties that can be legitimately deployed against ordinary 
witnesses but cannot be used to obtain self-incriminating statements 
from criminal defendants or suspects. 
There is obviously no verbal similarity and no necessary concep­
tual congruence between A and Z. It is only the labels traditionally 
used (coercion, involuntariness, and breaking the will for A; compul­
sion for Z) that sometimes trick us into assuming that concepts A and 
Z are essentially one. In fact they are distinct and only distantly re­
lated. And concept Z ("compulsion") clearly and inevitably - by 
definition - extends to pressures and penalties that are not prohibited 
by concept A ("involuntariness"). 
Thus it is not just Miranda that "sweeps more broadly" than the 
due process rule against involuntary statements. The Fifth Amendment 
itself sweeps more broadly than the due process rule against involun­
tary statements. Absent a valid waiver, the Fifth Amendment prohib­
its use of a compelled statement against the person compelled, even 
when the compelled statement is not involuntary within the meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The premise that Fifth Amendment 
compulsion means involuntariness is simply incoherent.15 
The second premise of Miranda criticism is that the only way to de­
termine whether a statement is really compelled is to assess the rele­
vant pressures under the totality of the circumstances. This premise 
fares no better than the first. If we set aside Fifth Amendment excep­
tionalism (the idea that police interrogation should be severed from 
the principles governing witness questioning in every other setting), 
then the totality-of-the-circumstances premise is indisputably wrong. 
Consider the classic example of impermissible Fifth Amendment 
compulsion - the threat of a contempt citation for refusal to testify 
under oath. That threat has always been treated as impermissibly 
compelling per se, even though many witnesses can and do resist it and 
face jail rather than testify. A comment at trial on a criminal defen-
15. This truncated analysis leaves open at least two important issues. First, to stress, as I 
have done here, the inherent distinction between Fourteenth Amendment involuntariness 
and Fifth Amendment compulsion does not by itself provide normative justification for the 
Fifth Amendment itself, that is for a constitutional regime that permits certain strong pres­
sures to be deployed against ordinary witnesses but not against criminal suspects. For discus­
sion of that normative issue, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311 (1991). 
Second, the analysis does not attempt to fill out the exact content of either "compulsion" 
or "involuntariness." It is only a partial defense of this gap to note that the Court itself has 
given little precise content to either term, and the distinction between them cannot be meas­
ured until the content of each is operationally defined. For one attempt to develop a formal 
definition of compulsion, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 435 (1987). For attempts to define involuntariness, see Catherine Hancock, Due 
Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195 (1996); Welsh S. White, What is an Involun­
tary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001 (1998). 
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dant's failure to testify is impermissibly compelling per se, regardless 
of the tactical and evidentiary factors that determine how much pres­
sure such a comment would present in a particular case.16 The point is 
made especially clear in Carter v. Kentucky.17 The Court not only 
noted the potentially compelling effect of commenting at trial on a de­
fendant's silence, but also observed that, even in the absence of any 
prosecutorial or judicial comment, a jury might draw inferences ad­
verse to the defendant "if left to roam at large with only its untutored 
instincts to guide it."18 As a result, the Court held, the trial judge "has 
an affirmative obligation" to warn the jury not to draw an adverse in­
ference from the defendant's silence.19 The judge's obligation to take 
affirmative steps to dispel potentially compelling pressures applies 
whenever the defendant requests such an instruction, regardless of any 
other trial circumstances. 
A threat to discharge a public employee for a refusal to testify 
likewise is impermissibly compelling per se.20 The actual force of such 
a threat for any given employee depends on the context - his assets, 
the time remaining until retirement, any vested pension rights, his em­
ployment opportunities in the private sector, and so on. Yet the Court 
has never suggested that the totality of the circumstances must be as­
sessed to determine if such a threat is compelling in light of the par­
ticular employee's economic situation; the specific circumstances are 
irrelevant.21 
The same principle applies to a threat to disqualify a contractor 
from doing business with public agencies because of his refusal to tes­
tify. A host of economic factors affects the impact of such a threat on 
any particular contractor. But under settled Fifth Amendment doc­
trine, such contextual factors are irrelevant. The disqualification 
threat, like the threat to discharge the public employee, is impermissi­
bly compelling per se.22 And there is no longer anything the least bit 
controversial about these holdings. None of the Justices has ever 
thought to brand them as overbroad prophylactic rules or illegitimate 
usurpations of legislative prerogative. 
In short, totality-of-circumstances analysis, so often touted as the 
only really pure and correct way to make Fifth Amendment judg-
16. Brooks v. Tennessee. 406 U. S. 605 (1972); Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609, 614 
(1965). 
17. 450 U. S. 288 (1981). 
18. Id. at 301. 
19. Id. at 303. 
20. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U. S. 801 (1977). 
21. Id. at 806. 
22. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973). The Court's refusal to consider circumstan­
tial distinctions in degrees of pressure is made explicit in an extended discussion, 414 U.S. at 
83-84. 
. 
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ments,23 is entirely foreign to the Court's Fifth Amendment jurispru­
dence, at least in settings other than the police station. 
B. The Origins of Exceptionalism 
The story of how the Court came to define compulsion differently 
in the police interrogation setting (what I have called Fifth 
Amendment exceptionalism) is revealing. Before Miranda, Fifth 
Amendment standards did not apply to police interrogation at all. In­
deed, during the good old 1950s and early 1960s, Fifth Amendment re­
strictions did not apply to any state proceedings whatsoever. The 
Federal Constitution barred use of confessions in a state case only 
when they were obtained by methods that in the totality of the circum­
stances broke the defendant's will or shocked the judicial conscience. 
Such confessions were deemed "involuntary."24 
It was not until 1964, just two years prior to Miranda, that the 
Court in Malloy v. Hogan25 took the revolutionary step of "incorpo­
rating" the Fifth Amendment and applying it to the states. Even then, 
the Fifth Amendment did not apply to police interrogation, federal or 
state, because courts usually defined Fifth Amendment compulsion to 
mean compulsion by formal process (by subpoena, for example), 
rather than informal pressure, however severe.26 In effect, questioning 
of suspects in police custody was subject to a different standard from 
official questioning of suspects in any other setting; Fifth Amendment 
exceptionalism was expressly encoded in legal doctrine prior to 
Miranda. But before Malloy, the Court had little occasion to confront 
the implications of this anomaly, because the Fifth Amendment was 
not applicable to the states, and because in federal cases the supervi­
sory rule suppressing statements obtained after an undue delay in ar­
raignment27 avoided much of the need to assess issues of Fifth 
Amendment compulsion. 
Then, two years after Malloy, the Miranda Court took another 
revolutionary step when it rejected the formal-process requirement 
and held that Fifth Amendment barred any substantial pressure, for-
23. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2346-48 (2000) ( Scalia, J., dis­
senting); Oregon v. Elstad. 470 U. S. 298, 306 (1985). 
24. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); see Catherine Hancock, Due Process 
Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195 (1996). 
25. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
26. See Brown v. Mississippi: "[T)he right of the State to withdraw the privilege against 
self-incrimination is not here involved. The compulsion to which the quoted statements 
[concerning to the Fifth Amendment) refer is that of the processes of justice by which the 
accused may be called as a witness and required to testify. Compulsion by torture to extort a 
confession is a different matter." 297 U.S. at 285 (emphasis added). 
27. Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449 (1957). 
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mal or informal.28 The Court's opinion recounted in detail the history 
of its interrogations cases and the jurisprudential divide that, until 
then, had distinguished its standards of Fourteenth 
Amendment "involuntariness" from its standards of Fifth Amendment 
"compulsion." In rejecting the artificial notion that only formal legal 
sanctions could count as "compelling," the Court ended Fifth 
Amendment exceptionalism and applied the Fifth Amendment di­
rectly to stationhouse interrogation. The Miranda Court made no ef­
fort to hide the fact that these steps represented a radical, though justi­
fied, break with the past. It ruled out stationhouse confessions 
obtained by informal compulsion, even though (and the Court said 
this explicitly) such confessions might not be involuntary in traditional 
Fourteenth Amendment terms.29 
I have mentioned two revolutionary steps, both of which involved 
a radical break from then-existing precedent: the decision to apply the 
Fifth Amendment to the states and the decision to include informal as 
well as formal pressures within the concept of Fifth Amendment com­
pulsion. Both steps now lie embedded in almost forty years of interro­
gation and noninterrogation precedent, and no member of the Court, 
Justices Scalia and Thomas included, shows any inclination to over­
turn them.30 
But, surprisingly, and with no fanfare, Fifth Amendment excep­
tionalism has crept back into the picture. Without questioning the ap­
plicability of the Fifth Amendment to the states and without chal­
lenging the premise that informal stationhouse pressure is a form of 
Fifth Amendment compulsion, the Court has managed to render these 
once-controversial steps virtually meaningless. By subtle phraseology, 
deployed originally by then-Justice Rehnquist and later followed by 
Justice O'Connor, the Court silently up-ended the conceptual basis of 
Miranda and once again rigidly compartmentalized its Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence. It began deciding police interrogation 
cases as if they had nothing to do with Fifth Amendment precedents in 
other settings. In the newly severed context of police interrogation, 
now regarded as sui generis, the Court began speaking as if real com­
pulsion (in that setting alone) required precisely what the Miranda 
Court had held unnecessary, the stringent "breaking the will" brand of 
28. "We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal 
compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning." Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 461 (1966) (emphasis added). 
29. "(W]e might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in tradi­
tional terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth Amendment 
rights is, of course, not lessened in the slightest." Miranda, 384 U. S. at 457. 
30. See Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 15, at 439, 453 (1987). 
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coercion that would render a confession involuntary in traditional 
Fourteenth Amendment terms.31 
We will probably never know whether Justice Rehnquist realized, 
as he wrote Tucker, that he was draining Fifth Amendment compul­
sion of its distinctive content, or whether verbal similarities between 
compulsion and coercion by "breaking the will" simply obscured for 
him the traditional distinction between Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment requirements. Either way, Tucker and subsequent cases 
echoing its language accomplished a world-class conceptual counter­
revolution. 
Miranda had brought Fifth Amendment standards into the sta­
tionhouse under the expressly stated assumption that those standards 
provided more protection than the traditional Fourteenth 
Amendment voluntariness requirement. Fifth Amendment require­
ments do "sweep more broadly" than those of the Fourteenth, and it 
was precisely for that reason that incorporation was, in its day, so con­
troversial. Starting with Tucker, the Court took the teeth out of incor­
poration by asserting that compulsion meant nothing different from 
involuntariness after all. If valid, that claim leaves one to wonder what 
all the fuss was about in Malloy v. Hogan and why Justices Harlan and 
Clark so passionately argued, in dissent, that only Fourteenth 
Amendment voluntariness, not freedom from Fifth Amendment com­
pulsion, should be required of the states. 
Tucker, however, dealt only with police interrogation and stopped 
short of equating compulsion with involuntariness across the board. Its 
author was perhaps content to plant seeds that could ultimately un­
dermine not only Miranda but the protective Fifth Amendment juris­
prudence applicable in non-stationhouse settings as well. However 
that may be, the net effect of the Tucker-Elstad-Quarles language was 
to bring the law full circle, reinstituting Fifth Amendment exception­
alism, and - for the stationhouse setting only - assuming that a con­
fession could be truly compelled only if it was judged involuntary un­
der the totality of the circumstances. 
That historical and conceptual background is crucial for assessing 
the legitimacy of the Miranda restrictions and the importance of as­
suring that they are respected in practice. When police interrogate a 
suspect who is alone, in custody, and unable to walk away from ques­
tions he wants to avoid; when police do not warn him that he isn't re­
quired to answer; when they do not warn him that he has the right to 
31. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 312, 315 (1985) ("[A) simple failure to adminis­
ter the warnings [is not equivalent to) actual coercion . . . [There) is a vast difference between 
coercion of a confession by physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to break 
the suspect's will and . . .  [a) disclosure freely given in response to an unwarned but noncoer­
cive question . . .  [R)espondent's earlier remark was voluntary, within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment." (emphasis added)). Note especially the last quoted sentence, giving the 
word "voluntary" textual status, as if it were part of the language of the Fifth Amendment. 
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cut off the questioning, return to his cell, and sleep or rest if he wishes; 
when they do not honor his pleas to be left alone and instead continue 
to press on him their questions, their seductive offers of help, and their 
alarming comments on the evidence against him, the pressures dwarf 
those faced by the public employee, the public contractor, or even 
many witnesses who (with the help of counsel) face a citation for con­
tempt.32 
Judged by the standards that govern Fifth Amendment assess­
ments in every other context, a police interrogation without warnings 
and without any right to escape unwanted questions is unambiguously 
compelling. And it is compelling per se, regardless of the suspect's age, 
intelligence, education, or economic circumstances, regardless of 
whether guns or billy clubs are waved in his face, and regardless of 
how long the questioning ultimately lasts.33 Absent safeguards as 
strong or stronger than those mandated by Miranda, such an interro­
gation, from the very outset, violates the Fifth Amendment - the real 
Fifth Amendment - and not just some set of broader, optional pro­
phylactic rules. 
32. The comparison suggested in the text perhaps oversimplifies in assuming a unitary 
metric to assess degrees of compulsion presented by qualitatively different forms of pres­
sure. Formal penalties are, in one sense, especially troublesome because they exact an ex­
plicit, officially sanctioned price for conduct that the Constitution expressly protects. And 
formal penalties can be prohibited without inviting the kind of line-drawing problems that 
inevitably attend attempts to prescribe informal pressures. From that perspective, one could 
conceivably argue that Fifth Amendment compulsion should be understood to embrace only 
formal sanctions, together with the extreme types of informal pressure that rise to the level 
of Fourteenth Amendment involuntariness. 
That approach, however, seems unsatisfactory as a matter of both substance and prece­
dent. Any effort to limit informal compulsion to sanctions that overbear the will would stand 
in tension with the case law applicable to informal economic pressure, most notably 
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977). Moreover, formal penalties are imposed 
openly, subject to specific limits and with time for a rational weighing of alternatives with the 
advice of counsel. From that perspective, the psychologically coercive effect of formal penal­
ties and their capacity to engender fear seem far less significant than is the case for many 
informal pressures, especially those deployed by police in the unregulated incommunicado 
context of custodial police interrogation. That said, the precise content of informal "compul­
sion" remains open to more specific elaboration. 
33. It is technically an overstatement to suggest that compulsion must inevitably be pre­
sent in every conceivable interrogation. Imagine that a knowledgeable suspect, fully aware 
of his right to silence and fully briefed by his attorney, is questioned without full Miranda 
warnings, after being assured that the arresting officer has only one short question to ask and 
will then leave the suspect alone in his cell. If the suspect then confesses, it would be implau­
sible to suggest that his response was the result of "compulsion." Cases of this sort, however, 
are surely rare, if not nonexistent. In virtually all real cases of custodial interrogation without 
warnings, the circumstantial pressures, from the very outset, are at least as significant as 
those found "compelling" in cases like Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981), Cunningham, 
431 U.S. 801 (1977), and Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70 (1973). For a discussion of the jus­
tification for per se rules in settings where a few cases might, if scrutinized, be found to lack 
the facts that are determinative in principle, see Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra 
note 15. 
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The conception of the Fifth Amendment I advance here may strike 
some as utopian. It is certainly not the criterion by which reform ef­
forts will be judged by the current Court or by any Court we are likely 
to get. So I will put myself in the shoes of Justices Kennedy, 
O'Connor, and Rehnquist and consider which possible reform alterna­
tives are likely to satisfy the more grudging conception of the Fifth 
Amendment that holds sway on the Court today. The controlling cri­
terion is that any alternative must include "procedures that will warn a 
suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and which will assure 
the suspect that his exercise of that right will be honored."34 
One much-discussed alternative to Miranda is the option of video­
taping the confession or the entire interrogation. Videotaping only the 
confession is useful only to the police; it provides others no window 
into the "suction process"35 by which the confession was elicited. So 
videotaping only the confession cannot possibly serve as a replace­
ment for any part of Miranda. I don't think anyone seriously suggests 
that it could. 
Videotaping the entire interrogation process is an alternative that 
some, Professor Cassell most prominently, suggest as a replacement 
for Miranda.36 Videotaping mitigates the problem of the swearing con­
test - it gives us a more or less clear picture of what occurred. But the 
swearing contest was not a problem that Miranda sought to solve, and 
videotaping does nothing to address the problems that Miranda did 
seek to address. 
Recall that the swearing contest problem was pressed on the Court 
in the Miranda arguments, but the Court chose to ignore it. On the he­
roic assumption that the normal fact-finding process will accurately re­
solve credibility questions, Miranda sought measures to dispel the in­
herently compelling effect of custodial interrogation. A videotape will 
not do that if, as Professor Cassell hopes,37 we can keep suspects from 
knowing about it. If suspects do not know that what police do to them 
in the interrogation room is being recorded for outside observers, the 
psychological atmosphere they confront will be exactly the same as the 
one the Miranda Court correctly pronounced inherently compelling. 
Even if suspects learn or are told explicitly that what happens to 
them in the privacy of the interrogation room is being taped, the pres-
34. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2335 (2000). The limitation, as originally 
stated in Miranda, is virtually identical: Any alternative must be "at least as effective in ap­
prising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to 
exercise it .... " 384 U.S. at 467. 
35. See Watts v. lndiana, 338 U. S. 49, 53 (1949) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
36. Cassell, supra note 2, at 492. 
37. Id. at 492 & n.610. 
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sures that Miranda sought to dissipate will nonetheless remain un­
checked. Any suspect who is worried about outright torture will find 
little reassurance in a tape that a lawless officer can turn off or destroy 
at will. The more subtle pressures remain unchanged and may even be 
enhanced if the suspect worries about how he will appear on tape as 
he persists in refusing to answer. A videotape unaccompanied by the 
existing Miranda system will make matters much worse, not better. 
There is no reason, moreover, to think that the Court's centrists 
would disagree. For the current Court, any valid alternative to 
Miranda must include "procedures that will warn a suspect in custody 
of his right to remain silent and which will assure the suspect that his 
exercise of that right will be honored."38 Videotaping the interroga­
tion, with or without the suspect's knowledge, does nothing to inform 
him of his right to remain silent, and it does nothing to assure him that 
his exercise of that right will be honored. Indeed, the aim of the video­
taping proposal is to eliminate Miranda's cut-off right and free the po­
lice to continue questioning the suspect who says he prefers not to 
talk.39 So as an alternative to Miranda, videotaping is a nonstarter. 
There is, however, an intriguing possibility for audio or videotape 
that the Court's test for alternatives brings to mind. Videotaping the 
interrogation does nothing to warn the suspect, but why not videotape 
or audiotape the warnings themselves? Any recent visitor to New 
York has probably heard the recorded message that greets you when 
you close the door of a taxicab. The voice of Mayor Giuliani, Barbra 
Streisand, or Oprah implores you to "buckle up," makes sure you 
know that using your seat belt is the cool thing to do. In interrogation, 
of course, a major concern centers on the tone in which police deliver 
the warnings; the worry is that police often manage to convey that no 
innocent person would sensibly seek to hide behind Miranda. So why 
do we leave the warnings up to the very people most likely to blunt 
their effect? 
A better approach would be a system in which, when the suspect 
gets into the back seat of the squad car, as soon as the door closes, he 
would hear the voice of Johnnie Cochran, Alan Dershowitz, or Yale 
Kamisar telling him his rights in no uncertain terms (or even imploring 
him to "buckle up"). That is a genuine alternative to the warnings 
branch of Miranda. Earlier versions of the same idea involved proce­
dures to have a magistrate or duty counsel at the stationhouse inform 
a suspect of his rights before interrogation could begin. 
Procedures of this sort would do almost everything that police­
delivered warnings can do, and they would avoid disputes about 
whether police delivered the warnings too late or got the details 
38. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335. 
39. See Cassell, supra note 2, at 492. 
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wrong. So these are promising alternatives to the warnings require­
ment of Miranda, and there is little doubt that the Court would uphold 
them as substitutes for police-delivered warnings.40 
Taking the same idea one step further, some suggested during the 
Dickerson debates that Miranda warnings had become superfluous. By 
now, they said, suspects no longer need warnings from the police, 
much less from Professor Kamisar. Thanks to movies and TV, they al­
ready know that they have the right to remain silent, and therefore, 
some said, it was really irrelevant whether Miranda was overruled.41 
The Court did not buy that argument for several pretty obvious 
reasons. Television scripts can change even faster than Supreme Court 
precedent. If warnings were no longer required, many police would 
stop giving them, and then the television shows might stop depicting 
them. Before long, suspects wouldn't know they had the right to re­
main silent. At that point, the Supreme Court would have to overrule 
the overruling and re-instate Miranda, at least for three or four televi­
sion seasons, when the cycle would start all over again. 
And that quirk is the least of the problems. The more basic points 
are two: First, a civics lesson, even one dramatized on a cop show, is 
no substitute for a warning from official sources at the moment of ar­
rest. Any arrestee, even a constitutional scholar, needs the assurance 
that his rights are acknowledged and accepted by those who hold him 
in their power. 
Second, the claim that now we all know our Miranda rights (be­
cause we've heard the warnings so often)42 refutes itself. The public's 
tendency to identify Miranda with the warnings requirement shows 
that, even now, after three decades, the public does not know its 
Miranda rights. The public, and many law students, still do not under­
stand the heart of Miranda, which lies not so much in the famous 
warnings as in the cut-off rule - that if at any time the suspect indi­
cates a desire to remain silent, all questioning must cease.43 This rule, 
far more than the warnings, revolutionized police interrogation and 
posed the greatest potential threat to the confession rate. We will al­
ways need a system to inform suspects of their rights at the time of ar­
rest, but an effective system of warnings can serve only as a substitute 
for police-delivered warnings, not for the other elements of the 
Miranda system. 
40. We might worry, however, that without police acknowledgment of the warnings, a 
suspect who knows perfectly well the rights that the law gives him would nonetheless have 
no assurance that the police were prepared to honor those rights. 
41. E.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Ok, All Together Now: 'You Have the Right to . . . ' L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999, at Ml. 
42. Amar, supra note 41. 
43. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966). 
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We could conceivably eliminate Miranda requirements altogether 
(the warnings, the express-waiver requirement and the suspect's right 
to cut off questioning at any time) if we required interrogation, like 
post-indictment line-ups, to be conducted only in the presence of 
counsel.44 Or we could prohibit all interrogation by police and permit 
questioning of an arrestee only when conducted by a magistrate in 
open court in the presence of defense counsel. Again, there is little 
doubt that the Court would uphold substitutes like these. 
But none of these proposals is very attractive to the political con­
stituencies that complain so insistently that "law enforcement never 
recovered from the blow inflicted by Miranda."45 Even the modest 
idea of replacing police-delivered warnings with Kamisar-delivered 
warnings is politically unacceptable for the same reason that it is not 
constitutionally unacceptable - it would be at least as protective of 
the suspect (and therefore at least as burdensome to investigators) as 
Miranda itself. 
The converse is also true. To attract political support, any substi­
tute for Miranda must to some extent dilute the protections that sus­
pects now get under Miranda. So politically attractive alternatives to 
Miranda cannot pass constitutional muster, and constitutional alterna­
tives cannot attract political support - unless the alternative's sup­
porters can spin their case well enough to dupe either the judicial or 
political audience, in one direction or the other. That's the real reason 
that no legislature has attempted to develop a serious replacement for 
the Miranda system. 
III. SUPPLEMENTS FOR MIRANDA 
Dickerson leaves us with only one question of practical signifi­
cance. The Miranda rules will remain as the constitutionally mandated 
floor, but there is ample room for steps to supplement the Miranda 
system. 
One attractive option would be to mandate videotaping in addition 
to the substantive ground rules laid down by Miranda. Videotaping 
would greatly reduce the problems of the swearing contest and, except 
for expenses (which generally appear to be minimal), videotaping in­
fringes no conceivable governmental interest. Everyone gains by 
having an unambiguous record of what actually occurred in the inter­
rogation.46 
There are a large number of other procedural possibilities -
changes in the rules governing use of confessions for impeachment, 
44. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
45. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs, supra note 4, at 1090-91. 
46. For more detailed discussion, see Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect, supra note 
4, at 556-57. 
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use of fruits, controls over deceptive interrogation methods, and safe­
guards against false confessions. All of these options pose similar 
problems of trying to honor constitutional rights, to maintain or en­
hance protections for the suspect (especially the innocent suspect), 
and simultaneously to maintain or enhance public safety by ade­
quately preventing violent crime. That dilemma is the constant preoc­
cupation of students of criminal procedure, and it will continue to de­
serve careful attention. 
Nonetheless, efforts to resolve that dilemma offer only limited op­
portunities for improvement. If we implement a system of stronger 
warnings, narrow some of the exceptions to Miranda, or grant defen­
dants a less onerous burden of proof, we set in motion a familiar de­
bate. Constitutional rights are better protected (at least a bit, at the 
margins), but crime control will suffer (at least a bit, at the margins). 
The implications can be projected with infinite imagination and re­
finement. But at the end of the day, the effects at issue are exceedingly 
small, on both the civil liberties and crime control sides of the equa­
tion. 
We can perhaps make progress if we are willing to step outside the 
narrow boundaries of the usual procedural reform debate. If our goal 
is (as it should be) the effective protection of the innocent and decent 
treatment of the guilty, we can accomplish infinitely more through 
structural reform of police departments and better delivery of defense 
services than we can ever hope to achieve by a dozen changes in im­
peachment doctrine or shifts in various burdens of proof.47 And gains 
from the first set of strategies should come with no adverse effect (and 
probably some beneficial effect) on our crime-control effort. 
There are similar win-win opportunities if we focus attention on 
proven strategies that make large dents in the crime rate without di­
minishing civil liberties. If our goal is (as it should be) the reduction of 
violent crime and effective protection of the most vulnerable members 
of society, we should be thinking about prenatal care in risky 
pregnancies, better health services for pre-school children, scattered 
site housing, Head Start and other education initiatives, better funding 
for battered women's shelters and intervention for abusive men, drug 
treatment on demand, and even hiring more police officers. For all of 
these strategies (with the possible exception of hiring more officers) 
there are now solid, uncontroversial data showing very large, cost­
effective crime-control gains.48 Again, we can accomplish infinitely 
47. Cf William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 65-74 (1997) (discussing importance of funding decisions 
and substantive culpability requirements). 
48. See NAT'L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT 
DOESN'T, WHAT'S PROMISING (1998); LISBETH 8. SCHORR, WITHIN OUR REACH (1988); 
John J. Donohue III & Peter Seligman, Allocating Resources Among Prisons and Social 
Programs in the Battle Against Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1998). 
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more through steps of this sort than we can ever hope to achieve by 
weakening Miranda, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and all 
the rest of the Warren Court edifice combined. And we can achieve 
those gains without putting any of our Bill of Rights safeguards at risk. 
So if crime control is on our minds, we cannot look at the details of 
criminal procedure in isolation. We have to consider the entire range 
of promising crime-reduction strategies. And we have to think care­
fully about which research projects or programmatic efforts should 
have the first claim on our limited time and energies.49 
Above all, we have to remember, as much on the crime-control 
side as on the civil-liberties side, that resources are crucial. In the mid-
1950's, before the Warren Court started "handcuffing the police," we 
had 121 police officers for every 100 violent crimes. By the 1990s that 
number had fallen to only 28 police officers for every 100 violent 
crimes.50 Whatever difficulties police may encounter because of new 
criminal procedure requirements pale in comparison to the burden we 
inflict on them when we leave each officer with, in effect, more than 
four times as many violent crimes to handle. 
It is in this light that I want to do what must be very bad form in a 
criminal procedure symposium, and that is to insist that we stop our 
obsessive focus on the technical nuances of criminal procedure. Courts 
still have to decide cases, and criminal procedure scholars still have to 
help them where we can. But we should not overestimate the value of 
the enterprise. Regardless of who is right or wrong about the implica­
tions of doctrinal change, the debate itself diverts energy and atten­
tion, our own and that of whatever public may be listening. This waste 
of time and energy is the real tragedy of the Dickerson case and the 
years of litigation and advocacy scholarship that law enforcement 
proponents devoted to their quixotic effort to force a reconsideration 
of Miranda. I hope that mistake will not be repeated in the years to 
come. 
49. See Stuntz, supra note 47, at 72-76. 
50. Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda, supra note 4, at 372. 
